{"id":4161,"date":"2025-08-14T20:12:59","date_gmt":"2025-08-14T20:12:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/?p=4161"},"modified":"2025-08-19T16:12:34","modified_gmt":"2025-08-19T16:12:34","slug":"linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-exploring-the-dual-duties-of-the-canadian-state","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/2025\/08\/linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-exploring-the-dual-duties-of-the-canadian-state\/","title":{"rendered":"Linking Arctic sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit: Exploring the dual duties of the Canadian state"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Author: <strong>Valere Gaspard, Ph.D. (cand.), uOttawa, Research Fellow, Western University Leadership and Democracy Lab<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<style>\n.light-heading {\n\tfont-weight: 500;\n}\n.heading-numeral {\n\tmin-width:2em;\n\tdisplay:inline-block;\n}\n.tbl-1 tbody th {\n\tfont-weight: 400;\n\tborder-color: var(--wp--preset--color--light-gold,#d3af51);\n}\nol.social-contracts {\n\tcounter-reset: list-counter; \/* Initialize the counter *\/\n\tlist-style: none;\n}\n\nol.social-contracts li {\n\tcounter-increment: list-counter;\n\tmargin-bottom: 10px;\n}\n\nol.social-contracts li::before {\n\tcontent: \"(\" counter(list-counter) \") \";\n}\n<\/style>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Executive Summary<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The link between Arctic sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit is rooted in dual duties of the Canadian state: (1) broad duties to all Canadians in its territory and (2) specific duties to Inuit through treaty obligations. Accomplishing these dual duties legitimizes the political authority of the Canadian state in the Arctic, especially since Inuit are the region\u2019s majority population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This research note substantiates the linkage between Arctic sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit. In addition to demonstrating the linkage between sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit, this research note also explains <em>why<\/em> this connection matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If the Canadian state cannot fulfill these duties as sovereign (specifically, to the majority population in its Arctic territory), then its claim to those territories weakens or fail at both the domestic and international level. This consequently weakens its capabilities to defend and secure its Arctic region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To substantiate these claims, this research note uses evidence about (1) Canada\u2019s Arctic and population, (2) Inuit Constitutional Rights and Treaty Agreements, and (3) Canada\u2019s political interest in the Arctic (<a href=\"#Section-I\">Section I: Background information<\/a>) to develop a framework linking Arctic sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit (<a href=\"#Section-II\">Section II: Framework: Arctic Sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:25px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"Section-I\"><span class=\"heading-numeral\">I.<\/span> Background information<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The three sub-sections in Section I of this note inform the proposed framework on Arctic sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit in Section II.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:25px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading light-heading\"><em><span class=\"heading-numeral\">i.<\/span> Canada\u2019s Arctic Region (Inuit Nunangat) and its population<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Canada\u2019s Circumpolar Regions account for 40% of Canada\u2019s territory and approximately 70% of its coastline.<a href=\"#_ftn1\" id=\"_ftnref1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a> For the purposes of this research note, Canada\u2019s Arctic region<a href=\"#_ftn2\" id=\"_ftnref2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> is considered the regions Inuit term \u201c<em>Inuit Nunangat<\/em>\u201d, which includes the northern area of the Northwest Territories and part of northern Yukon (the Inuvialuit Settlement Region), Nunavut, Nunavik in Northern Quebec, and Nunatsiavut in Northern Labrador (<a href=\"#Figure-2\">see Figure 2<\/a> in the Appendix).<a href=\"#_ftn3\" id=\"_ftnref3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a> Inuit Tapiritt Kanatami (ITK), the national organization representing Inuit in Canada, states that there are 51 communities across the Inuit Nunangat.<a href=\"#_ftn4\" id=\"_ftnref4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a> Statistics Canada estimates that out of the 70,545 Inuit living in Canada, approximately 69% live in Inuit Nunangat. Table 1 demonstrates that Inuit are the majority population in each of the Inuit Nunangat\u2019s four regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"Table-1\"><strong>Table 1: Population breakdown across Inuit Nunangat<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table tbl-1\" style=\"font-style:normal;font-weight:400\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" scope=\"col\"><strong>Region<\/strong><\/th><th class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" scope=\"col\"><strong>Inuit population<\/strong><\/th><th class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" scope=\"col\"><strong>Total population<\/strong><\/th><th class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" scope=\"col\"><strong>Percentage of Inuit out of total population<\/strong><\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><th class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" scope=\"row\">Inuvialuit region<a href=\"#_ftn5\" id=\"_ftnref5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/th><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">3,145<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">5,310<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">59.2%<\/td><\/tr><tr><th class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" scope=\"row\">Nunavut<a href=\"#_ftn6\" id=\"_ftnref6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/th><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">30,860<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">36,600<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">84.3%<\/td><\/tr><tr><th class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" scope=\"row\">Nunavik<a href=\"#_ftn7\" id=\"_ftnref7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a><\/th><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">12,595<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">13,990<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">90%<\/td><\/tr><tr><th class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" scope=\"row\">Nunatsiavut<a href=\"#_ftn8\" id=\"_ftnref8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/th><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">2,090<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">2,320<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">90.1%<\/td><\/tr><tr><th class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" scope=\"row\">Inuit Nunangat (four regions combined)<\/th><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">48,690<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">58,220<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">83.6%<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The percentage of Inuit relative to the total population of Inuit Nunangat highlights an important consideration in the discussion on Arctic sovereignty. Not only do 69% of Inuit in Canada live in the Arctic, but <em>most of the individuals in Canada\u2019s Arctic are Inuit<\/em>. Consequently, any circumstances or decisions that specifically impact Inuit also influence the majority population (and largest group) that reside in Canada\u2019s Arctic territory. &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:25px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading light-heading\"><em><span class=\"heading-numeral\">ii.<\/span> Inuit Constitutional Rights and Treaty Agreements<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Inuit are recognized under Canada\u2019s Constitution Act, 1982 (s. 35) as aboriginal peoples and therefore have recognized and affirmed treaty and aboriginal rights.<a href=\"#_ftn9\" id=\"_ftnref9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> This means that in addition to any broad normative obligations the Canadian state has towards its residents and\/or citizens (i.e., protection and well-being), it also has specific obligations to Inuit regarding treaties and rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Canada\u2019s Crown currently has five agreements with Inuit Treaty Organizations in the following regions: (1) the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (for the Inuvialuit Settlement Region);<a href=\"#_ftn10\" id=\"_ftnref10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a> (2) the Nunavut Agreement (for Nunavut);<a href=\"#_ftn11\" id=\"_ftnref11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a> (3) the Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement<a href=\"#_ftn12\" id=\"_ftnref12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a> as well as (4) the James Bay and Northern Qu\u00e9bec Agreement<a href=\"#_ftn13\" id=\"_ftnref13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a> (for Nunavik); and (5) the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreements (for Nunatsiavut).<a href=\"#_ftn14\" id=\"_ftnref14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a> Table 2 lists key principles from these treaty agreements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"Table-2\"><strong>Table 2: Examples from Inuit treaty agreements&nbsp;<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th scope=\"col\"><strong>Treaty agreement<\/strong><\/th><th scope=\"col\"><strong>Examples of key principles<\/strong><\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td><em>Inuvialuit Final Agreement<\/em> <strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><\/td><td>1) Helping to preserve Inuvialuit cultural identity and values within a changing northern society (s. 1(a)).<br><br>2) Enabling Inuvialuit to be equal and meaningful participants in the northern and national economy and society (s. 1(b)).<br><br>3) Protecting and preserving the Arctic wildlife, environment and biological productivity (s. 1(c)).<br><br>4) Ceding aboriginal claims, rights titles and interests to the region(s) within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Canada, subject to the rights and benefits in the agreement (s. 3) \u2013 however, this does not annul aboriginal rights guaranteed under the Constitution Act, 1982 or other rights given to Canadian citizens. <strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><\/td><\/tr><tr><td><em>Nunavut Agreement<\/em> <strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><\/td><td>1) Clarify and provide rights (e.g., ownership and use of lands, decision-making concerning wildlife harvesting, conservation of land, water and resources, including the offshore, of land to ownership, use of lands, etc.) (Preamble).<br><br>2) Provide Inuit with financial compensation and means of participating in economic opportunities (Preamble).<br><br>3) Encourage self-reliance and the cultural and social well-being of Inuit (Preamble).<br><br>4) Ceding aboriginal claims, rights titles and interests to the region(s) and water(s) within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Canada (s. 2.7.1) \u2013 however, this does not annul aboriginal rights guaranteed under the Constitution Act, 1982 or other rights given to Canadian citizens. <strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><\/td><\/tr><tr><td><em>Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement<\/em> <strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><\/td><td>1) Provide certainty regarding rights to ownership and use of lands and resources, including marine resources (Preamble).<br><br>2) Nothing in the Agreement shall deny that Nunavik Inuit are an aboriginal people of Canada (includes maintaining rights to participate in and benefit from government programs for Nunavik Inuit or aboriginal people, and any rights or benefits under the James Bay and Northern Qu\u00e9bec Agreement) (s. 2.3). &nbsp;<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><em>James Bay and Northern Qu\u00e9bec Agreement<\/em> <em>&nbsp;<\/em><\/td><td>1) \u201cIn consideration of the rights and benefits herein set forth in favour of the James Bay Crees and the Inuit of Qu\u00e9bec, the James Bay Crees and the Inuit of Qu\u00e9bec hereby cede, release, surrender and convey all their Native claims, rights, titles and interests, whatever they may be, in and to land in the Territory and in Qu\u00e9bec, and Qu\u00e9bec and Canada accept such surrender. (s. 2.1.)<br><br>2) In response, Canada undertakes obligations to give, grant, recognize and provide rights, privileges and benefits outlined in the agreement to the Inuit of Qu\u00e9bec. &nbsp;<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><em>Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreements<\/em> <strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><\/td><td>1) \u201cThe Agreement sets out principles for the establishment of a free and democratic government for Inuit\u201d (Preamble).<br><br>2) Nothing in the agreement denies that Inuit are aboriginal people of Canada or \u201cInuit are \u201cIndians\u201d within the meaning of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867\u201d (s. 2.3.1), and does not impact their ability to participate in or benefit from programs for aboriginal people (s. 2.6.1).<br><br>3) \u201cInuit hereby cede and release to Canada and the Province all the aboriginal rights which Inuit ever had, now have, or may in future claim to have within Canada\u201d (s. 2.11.2) &nbsp;<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>In essence, the treaties create an agreement akin to a social contract between the Canadian state and each of the Inuit Treaty Organizations. According to social contract theorists, citizens trade-off part of their natural freedoms to the state and sovereign, and in return receive benefits from the state such as protection of life, property, or social services.<a href=\"#_ftn15\" id=\"_ftnref15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the case of Inuit, the listed treaty agreements cede certain claims and titles to the group\u2019s traditional territory (while maintaining their rights as Aboriginal people), and in return are guaranteed protected rights by the Canadian state. While these treaties recognize the sovereignty of the Canadian state within the Inuit Nunangat regions, Inuit recognition of Canadian sovereignty is premised on receiving the rights and benefits that are guaranteed in the agreements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ultimately, these treaty agreements highlight that the sovereignty of the Canadian state in its Arctic is rooted in two separate levels of social contracts:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list social-contracts\">\n<li><em>A broad social contract between all Canadian citizens\/residents and the Canadian state.<\/em><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><em>A narrower social contract (legalized by treatment agreements) between Inuit and the Canadian state.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p>This is an important assumption for the framework on Arctic sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit in Section II of this research note, since it substantiates that the Canadian state, as sovereign, holds two-levels of social contract obligations to Inuit (one that applies to all individuals in Canada, and one that applies specifically to Inuit).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In addition to these social contract obligations pertaining to Inuit well-being, it is important to recognize the harms of the Canadian state\u2019s colonialism on Inuit<a href=\"#_ftn16\" id=\"_ftnref16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a> and the impacts it has on their current well-being. While obligations pertaining to reconciliation fall outside the scope of this research note, they remain an important consideration in the broader topic of Inuit well-being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:25px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading light-heading\"><em><span class=\"heading-numeral\">iii.<\/span> Canada\u2019s political interest in the Arctic<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Political interest in Canada\u2019s Arctic is not new. Canada began taking substantial actions to assert and enforce its sovereignty in the 20<sup>th<\/sup> century.<a href=\"#_ftn17\" id=\"_ftnref17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a> More recently, the federal government released its <em>Arctic and Northern Policy Framework<\/em> (September 2019),<a href=\"#_ftn18\" id=\"_ftnref18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a> <em>Arctic Foreign Policy<\/em> (December 2024),<a href=\"#_ftn19\" id=\"_ftnref19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a> and has made promises (March 2025) to expand the Northern and Arctic operations of the Canadian Armed Forces so that it \u201cwill be better placed to defend Canada\u2019s Arctic presence and sovereignty\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn20\" id=\"_ftnref20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2019, <em>Canada\u2019s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework<\/em> listed \u201cclear priorities and actions set out by the federal government and its partners\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn21\" id=\"_ftnref21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a> such as nurturing families and communities, creating jobs, growing Arctic and northern economies, investing in energy, transportation and communication infrastructure, advancing reconciliation, and ensuring Canada\u2019s northern and Arctic residents are safe, secure and well-defended. While Canada\u2019s 2024 <em>Arctic Foreign Policy<\/em> references the 2019 framework in its Executive Summary,<a href=\"#_ftn22\" id=\"_ftnref22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a> the 2024 document describes the Arctic as \u201ca theatre of interest for many non-Arctic states and actors aspiring for a greater role in Arctic affairs\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn23\" id=\"_ftnref23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a> and advances four policy pillars to \u201csupport a stable, prosperous and secure Arctic\u201d: (1) \u201cAsserting Canada\u2019s sovereignty\u201d, (2) \u201cAdvancing Canada\u2019s interests through pragmatic diplomacy\u201d, (3) \u201cLeadership on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges\u201d, and (4) \u201cAdopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn24\" id=\"_ftnref24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a> Consequently, the policy pillars infer that Canada\u2019s contemporary priorities in the Arctic pertain to defence, Canada as an actor on the international stage, and preparing for an Arctic Ocean that \u201cwill become an increasingly viable shipping route between Europe and Asia during the summer\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn25\" id=\"_ftnref25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Given the current emphasis on Arctic sovereignty in Canada\u2019s contemporary political context, it is important to examine the linkage between Arctic sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Canada proposes in its <em>Arctic Foreign Policy<\/em> that \u201cnational security is also supported by human security\u201d and that \u201cresilient local communities are vital to national defence\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn26\" id=\"_ftnref26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a> Inuit make up 83.6% of the Arctic\u2019s total population and are the majority in these local communities. Therefore, <strong>to uphold the <em>Arctic Foreign Policy<\/em>\u2019s goals of sovereignty through resilient local communities and human security, Canada must support the well-being of Inuit.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, there is no definition of well-being for Inuit or for living in Inuit Nunangat. While Inuit Treaty Organizations or other actors may espouse their own visions, there are no publicly documented measures of progress toward defined goals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Inuit should therefore define their vision of well-being and provide goals for the Canadian government to meet in partnership with Inuit<\/strong>.<a href=\"#_ftn27\" id=\"_ftnref27\"><strong><sup>[27]<\/sup><\/strong><\/a><strong> Meeting these well-being goals (and regularly measuring their progress) reinforces and legitimizes the Canadian state\u2019s claim to Arctic sovereignty through the presence of Inuit and resilient communities in Inuit Nunangat.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:25px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"Section-II\"><span class=\"heading-numeral\">II.<\/span> Framework: Arctic Sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201c<em>Sovereignty can be broadly and provisionally understood as a legitimated claim to political authority<\/em>.\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn28\" id=\"_ftnref28\"><sup>[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The connection between Canada\u2019s Arctic sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit has been suggested before. Three examples include: (1) Mary Simon\u2019s proposal (as President of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK)) that for \u201cCanada to assert its sovereignty legitimately in the Arctic, it must also ensure that Inuit are treated as all other Canadians are \u2026 with the same standard of education, health care, and infrastructure that is the foundation of healthy communities across Canada\u201d;<a href=\"#_ftn29\" id=\"_ftnref29\"><sup>[29]<\/sup><\/a> (2) the Inuit Circumpolar Council\u2019s <em>Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic<\/em> which declares that the \u201cfoundation, projection and enjoyment of Arctic sovereignty and sovereign rights [for Arctic states] all require healthy and sustainable communities in the Arctic\u201d;<a href=\"#_ftn30\" id=\"_ftnref30\"><sup>[30]<\/sup><\/a> and (3) ITK\u2019s statement that \u201cprospering Inuit communities are integral to Canada\u2019s sovereignty and long-term security and defence objectives in the Arctic\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn31\" id=\"_ftnref31\"><sup>[31]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The three examples connecting Canada\u2019s Arctic sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit consider sovereignty through the lens of what Loukacheva calls a \u2018Northern vision of sovereignty\u2019, which assumes a state\u2019s legitimate claim to political authority (sovereignty) is shown through building \u201ccivil society, social well-being, economic self-reliance, and participation of citizens in decision-making processes affecting the Arctic\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn32\" id=\"_ftnref32\"><sup>[32]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In classic \u2018social contract theory\u2019 (the theory that rationalizes the creation of the state), the state is sovereign when citizens enter a compact with it. Citizens forfeit part of their natural freedoms (i.e., operating and living free from state coercion) to the sovereign\/state and in return receive benefits and protections. These include protection from violence<a href=\"#_ftn33\" id=\"_ftnref33\"><sup>[33]<\/sup><\/a> or protection of property<a href=\"#_ftn34\" id=\"_ftnref34\"><sup>[34]<\/sup><\/a> among other examples. As the legitimate political authority, the state (which derives its authority through its citizens) has obligations to those citizens through its social contract. If the state does not fulfill its social contract, then the basis for the existence of that state (what gives it sovereignty and legitimate authority) is no longer there.<a href=\"#_ftn35\" id=\"_ftnref35\"><sup>[35]<\/sup><\/a> For this reason, \u201csovereignty can be broadly and provisionally understood as a legitimated claim to political authority\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn36\" id=\"_ftnref36\"><sup>[36]<\/sup><\/a> This infers that a key component of a state\u2019s legitimacy is the \u201cpopulation\u2019s sense of obligation or willingness to accept [the state\u2019s] authority\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn37\" id=\"_ftnref37\"><sup>[37]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The rationale of connecting well-being to sovereignty is therefore plausible through both the lens of a \u2018Northern vision of sovereignty\u2019 as well as classic understandings of social contract theory. The state achieves sovereignty through the social contract with its citizens, and then reinforces its legitimate claim to political authority (its sovereignty) through a variety of tactics, including the well-being of the residents\/citizens in its territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This rationale on sovereignty and legitimacy, combined with the evidence from Section I of this research note provides a clear response to the question: \u201c<em>does Arctic sovereignty require the well-being of Inuit?<\/em>\u201d Specifically, the well-being of Inuit is required for the Canadian state to demonstrate its Arctic sovereignty both domestically and internationally:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:25px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading light-heading\"><em><span class=\"heading-numeral\">i.<\/span> Demonstrating Canadian Arctic sovereignty domestically<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The social contract between citizens and the state makes the state sovereign. The state has a duty through its social contract to all citizens\/residents in its territory. However, as shown in Section 1, the Canadian state also has specific social contracts (treaties) with Inuit, on top of its regular duties towards citizens\/residents in its jurisdiction. Therefore, Inuit recognition of the state\u2019s sovereignty is two-fold: (1) the fulfillment of the social contract that applies to all citizens and (2) the fulfillment of the social contract (treaties) that only apply to Inuit (see Figure 1).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"Figure-1\"><strong>Figure 1: Inuit\u2019s social contracts with the Canadian state<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image aligncenter size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"730\" src=\"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-1-1-1024x730.png\" alt=\"Inuit\u2019s social contracts with the Canadian state: 1) Canadian (Arctic) Sovereignty; 2) Specific Social Contracts with Inuit (Treaties); 3) Social Contract with all Canadians (including Inuit)\n\n\n\" class=\"wp-image-4174\" srcset=\"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-1-1-1024x730.png 1024w, https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-1-1-300x214.png 300w, https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-1-1-768x548.png 768w, https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-1-1-1536x1095.png 1536w, https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-1-1.png 1547w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Since Inuit are the majority population in the Arctic, their recognition of the legitimacy of the Canadian state and its sovereignty is crucial for claims of Arctic sovereignty. To receive ongoing recognition from its Arctic population, the Canadian state must fulfill its social contracts \u2013 ensuring the broader well-being of Canadians and the more specific well-being of Inuit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In turn, their presence and well-being in the Arctic (as Inuit living in Canada) reenforces Canada\u2019s claims of Arctic sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:25px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading light-heading\"><em><span class=\"heading-numeral\">ii.<\/span> Demonstrating Canadian Arctic sovereignty internationally<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>In addition to fulfilling the Canadian state\u2019s social contracts with Inuit, ensuring the well-being of Inuit is also vital for Canada to receive recognition of Arctic sovereignty from the international community. Some argue that receiving recognition at the international level is an essential part of demonstrating sovereignty.<a href=\"#_ftn38\" id=\"_ftnref38\"><sup>[38]<\/sup><\/a> In the past, the Canadian state has attempted to demonstrate its sovereignty over its Arctic territory (land, ice, and waterways) through \u2018symbolic sovereignty\u2019 which \u201cconsists of actions taken to fulfill the format requirements of sovereignty under international law\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn39\" id=\"_ftnref39\"><sup>[39]<\/sup><\/a> A historic example of this was opening a RCMP detachment on Ellesmere Island at the Bache Peninsula (despite there being no human residents on the island at the time) in 1926. In more recent decades, the Canadian state has practiced \u2018developmental sovereignty\u2019 (what international law considers the \u201cconsolidation of sovereignty\u201d) which consists of formulating \u201ca policy for the development of territory under its control\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn40\" id=\"_ftnref40\"><sup>[40]<\/sup><\/a> In the late 20<sup>th<\/sup> century, the Canadian state used the administration of law in criminal cases to demonstrate its \u201ceffective administration of territory\u201d in the Arctic.<a href=\"#_ftn41\" id=\"_ftnref41\"><sup>[41]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For the 21<sup>st<\/sup> century, the Canadian state can demonstrate its \u2018effective administration of territory\u2019 through Inuit well-being. This would be in line with the Canadian government\u2019s political priorities, as stated in Section 1 of this research note. The Canadian government\u2019s <em>Canada\u2019s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework<\/em> (2019) lists priorities related to Inuit well-being (nurturing families, creating jobs, etc.) while its <em>Arctic Foreign Policy<\/em> (2024) states that it will assert Canada\u2019s sovereignty in the Arctic to \u201csupport a stable, prosperous and secure Arctic\u201d. These priorities are not mutually exclusive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Part of demonstrating sovereignty at the international level consists of developing territory under the state\u2019s control \u2013 therefore, partnering with Inuit (the majority population in the Arctic territory) to create infrastructure and policies that result in their well-being is necessary for exercising sovereignty in the Arctic. If the Canadian state only exercises its sovereignty through presence (such as expanding the Northern and Arctic operations of the Canadian Armed Forces) it risks only fulfilling the criteria of symbolic sovereignty over the Arctic. To fully demonstrate its Arctic sovereignty, it must work with Inuit to help ensure their well-being (the majority population of Canada\u2019s Arctic).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If Inuit well-being and access to services (such as education and healthcare) do not meet the same standards as other Canadians, then it is more difficult for the Canadian state to demonstrate its legitimacy and sovereignty over the Arctic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If the Canadian state is sovereign over its Arctic, it must guarantee the well-being of the citizens\/residents that live there, like it would for Canadians living in other parts of its territory. If the Canadian state cannot fulfill its social contracts with the people of the Arctic, its claim to those territories weakens or fail both domestically and internationally.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:25px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"heading-numeral\">III.<\/span> Appendix<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"Figure-2\"><strong>Figure 2: Map of Inuit Nunangat<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"784\" src=\"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-2-1024x784.jpg\" alt=\"a map of Inuit Nunangat (Canada\u2019s Arctic region)\" class=\"wp-image-4176\" srcset=\"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-2-1024x784.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-2-300x230.jpg 300w, https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-2-768x588.jpg 768w, https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2025-08_linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-figure-2.jpg 1256w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Figure 2 depicts a map of Inuit Nunangat (Canada\u2019s Arctic region). The map was developed by Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (2022) and is used in their June 2025 report: \u201cAn Inuit Vision for Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Defence\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn42\" id=\"_ftnref42\"><strong><sup>[42]<\/sup><\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:100px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-group has-global-padding is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity is-style-wide\" style=\"margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0\"\/>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:10px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" id=\"_ftn1\">[1]<\/a> Government of Canada. <em>Canada and the Circumpolar Regions<\/em>. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2025). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/world-monde\/international_relations-relations_internationales\/arctic-arctique\/index.aspx?lang=eng\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/world-monde\/international_relations-relations_internationales\/arctic-arctique\/index.aspx?lang=eng<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref2\" id=\"_ftn2\">[2]<\/a> The definition of what constitutes Canada\u2019s Arctic region can vary. Inuit Tapiritt Kanatami considers it the Inuit Nunangat region. Other accounts limit the region to the Arctic Circle (the northern area of Canada\u2019s three territories), the North Circumpolar Region (including the entirety of Yukon and the Northwest Territories (in addition to Inuit Nunangat) but excluding Northern Labrador), or Northern Canada (Canada\u2019s Arctic terrain) as a whole (Canada\u2019s three territories, Northern Manitoba, Northern Quebec, and Northern Labrador).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref3\" id=\"_ftn3\">[3]<\/a> Inuit Tapiritt Kanatami (ITK). <em>An Inuit Vision for Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Defence<\/em>. (Ottawa: ITK, 2025), 5.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref4\" id=\"_ftn4\">[4]<\/a> <em>ibid<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref5\" id=\"_ftn5\">[5]<\/a> Statistics Canada. <em>Indigenous Population Profile (Inuvialuit region), 2021 Census of Population<\/em>. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2023). <a href=\"https:\/\/www12.statcan.gc.ca\/census-recensement\/2021\/dp-pd\/ipp-ppa\/details\/page.cfm?Lang=E&amp;SearchText=Inuvialuit%20region&amp;DGUID=2021C1005086&amp;GENDER=1&amp;AGE=1&amp;HP=0&amp;HH=0\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www12.statcan.gc.ca\/census-recensement\/2021\/dp-pd\/ipp-ppa\/details\/page.cfm?Lang=E&amp;SearchText=Inuvialuit%20region&amp;DGUID=2021C1005086&amp;GENDER=1&amp;AGE=1&amp;HP=0&amp;HH=0<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref6\" id=\"_ftn6\">[6]<\/a> Statistics Canada. <em>Indigenous Population Profile (Nunavut), 2021 Census of Population<\/em>. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2023). <a href=\"https:\/\/www12.statcan.gc.ca\/census-recensement\/2021\/dp-pd\/ipp-ppa\/details\/page.cfm?Lang=e&amp;SearchText=Nunavut&amp;DGUID=2021C1005085&amp;GENDER=1&amp;AGE=1&amp;HP=0&amp;HH=0\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www12.statcan.gc.ca\/census-recensement\/2021\/dp-pd\/ipp-ppa\/details\/page.cfm?Lang=e&amp;SearchText=Nunavut&amp;DGUID=2021C1005085&amp;GENDER=1&amp;AGE=1&amp;HP=0&amp;HH=0<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref7\" id=\"_ftn7\">[7]<\/a> Statistics Canada. <em>Indigenous Population Profile (Nunavik), 2021 Census of Population<\/em>. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2023). <a href=\"https:\/\/www12.statcan.gc.ca\/census-recensement\/2021\/dp-pd\/ipp-ppa\/details\/page.cfm?Lang=E&amp;DGUID=2021C1005084&amp;SearchText=nunavik&amp;HP=0&amp;HH=0&amp;GENDER=1&amp;AGE=1&amp;RESIDENCE=1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www12.statcan.gc.ca\/census-recensement\/2021\/dp-pd\/ipp-ppa\/details\/page.cfm?Lang=E&amp;DGUID=2021C1005084&amp;SearchText=nunavik&amp;HP=0&amp;HH=0&amp;GENDER=1&amp;AGE=1&amp;RESIDENCE=1<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref8\" id=\"_ftn8\">[8]<\/a> Statistics Canada. <em>Indigenous Population Profile (Nunatsiavut), 2021 Census of Population<\/em>. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2023). <a href=\"https:\/\/www12.statcan.gc.ca\/census-recensement\/2021\/dp-pd\/ipp-ppa\/details\/page.cfm?Lang=e&amp;SearchText=Nunatsiavut&amp;DGUID=2021C1005083&amp;GENDER=1&amp;AGE=1&amp;HP=0&amp;HH=0\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www12.statcan.gc.ca\/census-recensement\/2021\/dp-pd\/ipp-ppa\/details\/page.cfm?Lang=e&amp;SearchText=Nunatsiavut&amp;DGUID=2021C1005083&amp;GENDER=1&amp;AGE=1&amp;HP=0&amp;HH=0<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref9\" id=\"_ftn9\">[9]<\/a> Government of Canada. <em>Consolidation of Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982<\/em>. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2025). <a href=\"https:\/\/laws-lois.justice.gc.ca\/eng\/const\/const_index.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/laws-lois.justice.gc.ca\/eng\/const\/const_index.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref10\" id=\"_ftn10\">[10]<\/a> Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. <em>The Inuvialuit Final Agreement as amended: consolidated version<\/em>. (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2013 (2005)). <a href=\"https:\/\/publications.gc.ca\/site\/eng\/9.853161\/publication.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/publications.gc.ca\/site\/eng\/9.853161\/publication.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref11\" id=\"_ftn11\">[11]<\/a> Indian and Norther Affairs Canada. <em>Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada. <\/em>(Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2013 (1993)). <a href=\"https:\/\/publications.gc.ca\/site\/eng\/9.696303\/publication.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/publications.gc.ca\/site\/eng\/9.696303\/publication.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref12\" id=\"_ftn12\">[12]<\/a> Government of Canada. <em>Nunavik Inuit Land Claims <\/em>Agreement. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2011 (2006)). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca\/eng\/1320425236476\/1551119558759\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca\/eng\/1320425236476\/1551119558759<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref13\" id=\"_ftn13\">[13]<\/a> Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Emploi et de la Solidarit\u00e9 sociale. Consolidated Agreement. (Quebec: Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Emploi et de la Solidarit\u00e9 sociale, 1975). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca\/produits-en-ligne\/conventions\/lois\/james-bay-and-northern-quebec-agreement-and-complementary-agreements\/consolidated-agreement\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca\/produits-en-ligne\/conventions\/lois\/james-bay-and-northern-quebec-agreement-and-complementary-agreements\/consolidated-agreement\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref14\" id=\"_ftn14\">[14]<\/a> Government of Canada. <em>Land Claims Agreement Between the Inuit of Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Newfoundland and Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada<\/em>. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2010). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca\/eng\/1293647179208\/1542904949105\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca\/eng\/1293647179208\/1542904949105<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref15\" id=\"_ftn15\">[15]<\/a> Thomas Hobbes. \u201cLeviathan\u201d;John Lockes. \u201cSecond Treatise of Government\u201d; and Jean Jacques Rousseau. \u201cOn the Social Contract\u201d in <em>Classics of Moral and Political Theory: Fifth Edition<\/em>, ed. Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis\/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref16\" id=\"_ftn16\">[16]<\/a> Mark B. Salter journal article \u201cArctic Security, Territory, Population: Canadian Sovereignty and the International\u201d in <em>International Political Sociology<\/em> 13 (2019), notes on page 371 that Inuit have called the Canadian government into account for colonial acts including: the residential school system, relocation, the slaughter of sled dogs, and other policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref17\" id=\"_ftn17\">[17]<\/a> William R. Morrison. \u201cCanadian Sovereignty and the Inuit of the Central and Eastern Arctic\u201d, <em>Inuit Studies <\/em>10, no. 1\/2 (1986): 245. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/42869548\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/42869548<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref18\" id=\"_ftn18\">[18]<\/a> Government of Canada. <em>Canada\u2019s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework<\/em>. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2019). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca\/eng\/1560523306861\/1560523330587\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca\/eng\/1560523306861\/1560523330587<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref19\" id=\"_ftn19\">[19]<\/a> Government of Canada. <em>Canada\u2019s Arctic Foreign Policy<\/em>. (Ottawa: Global Affairs Canada, 2024). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/gac-amc\/assets\/pdfs\/publications\/arctic-arctique\/arctic-policy-politique-en.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/gac-amc\/assets\/pdfs\/publications\/arctic-arctique\/arctic-policy-politique-en.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref20\" id=\"_ftn20\">[20]<\/a> Prime Minister of Canada. <em>Prime Minister Carney strengthens Canada\u2019s security and sovereignty<\/em>. (Iqaluit: Office of the Prime Minister, 2025). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pm.gc.ca\/en\/news\/news-releases\/2025\/03\/18\/prime-minister-carney-strengthens-canada-security-and-sovereignty\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.pm.gc.ca\/en\/news\/news-releases\/2025\/03\/18\/prime-minister-carney-strengthens-canada-security-and-sovereignty<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref21\" id=\"_ftn21\">[21]<\/a> Government of Canada. <em>Canada\u2019s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework<\/em>. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2019), 2. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca\/eng\/1560523306861\/1560523330587\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca\/eng\/1560523306861\/1560523330587<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref22\" id=\"_ftn22\">[22]<\/a> Government of Canada. <em>Canada\u2019s Arctic Foreign Policy<\/em>. (Ottawa: Global Affairs Canada, 2024), 5. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/gac-amc\/assets\/pdfs\/publications\/arctic-arctique\/arctic-policy-politique-en.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/gac-amc\/assets\/pdfs\/publications\/arctic-arctique\/arctic-policy-politique-en.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref23\" id=\"_ftn23\">[23]<\/a> <em>ibid.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref24\" id=\"_ftn24\">[24]<\/a> <em>ibid, <\/em>16.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref25\" id=\"_ftn25\">[25]<\/a> <em>ibid<\/em>, 5.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref26\" id=\"_ftn26\">[26]<\/a> <em>ibid<\/em>, 17.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref27\" id=\"_ftn27\">[27]<\/a> These goals could entail requisite funding of programs, services, and infrastructure to support thriving Inuit communities in their unique contexts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref28\" id=\"_ftn28\">[28]<\/a> Luke Glanville. \u201cSovereignty\u201d in <em>The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect<\/em>, eds Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 153. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/oxfordhb\/9780198753841.001.0001\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/oxfordhb\/9780198753841.001.0001<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref29\" id=\"_ftn29\">[29]<\/a> Mary Simon. \u201cInuit and the Canadian Arctic: Sovereignty Begins at Home,\u201d <em>Journal of Canadian Studies<\/em> 43, no. 2 (2009): 251. <a href=\"https:\/\/muse.jhu.edu\/pub\/50\/article\/384819\/pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/muse.jhu.edu\/pub\/50\/article\/384819\/pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref30\" id=\"_ftn30\">[30]<\/a> Inuit Circumpolar Council. <em>A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic<\/em>. (Greenland, Canada, Alaska, Chukotka: Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2009).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref31\" id=\"_ftn31\">[31]<\/a> Inuit Tapiritt Kanatami (ITK). <em>An Inuit Vision for Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Defence<\/em>. (Ottawa: ITK, 2025), 3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref32\" id=\"_ftn32\">[32]<\/a> Natalia Loukacheva. \u201cNunavut and Canadian Arctic Sovereignty,\u201d <em>Journal of Canadian Studies <\/em>43, no. 2 (2009): 97. <a href=\"https:\/\/muse.jhu.edu\/article\/384826\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/muse.jhu.edu\/article\/384826<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref33\" id=\"_ftn33\">[33]<\/a> Thomas Hobbes. \u201cLeviathan\u201din <em>Classics of Moral and Political Theory: Fifth Edition<\/em>, ed. Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis\/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011), 635-39. &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref34\" id=\"_ftn34\">[34]<\/a> John Lockes. \u201cSecond Treatise of Government\u201d in <em>Classics of Moral and Political Theory: Fifth Edition<\/em>, ed. Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis\/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011), 712-13.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref35\" id=\"_ftn35\">[35]<\/a> Jean Jacques Rousseau. \u201cOn the Social Contract\u201d in <em>Classics of Moral and Political Theory: Fifth Edition<\/em>, ed. Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis\/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011), 887.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref36\" id=\"_ftn36\">[36]<\/a> Luke Glanville. \u201cSovereignty\u201d in <em>The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect<\/em>, eds Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 153. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/oxfordhb\/9780198753841.001.0001\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/oxfordhb\/9780198753841.001.0001<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref37\" id=\"_ftn37\">[37]<\/a> Thomas Risse and Eric Stollenwerk. \u201cLegitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood,\u201d <em>Annual Review of Political Science<\/em> 21, (2018): 404.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref38\" id=\"_ftn38\">[38]<\/a> Stephen D. Krasner. \u201cAbiding Sovereignty,\u201d <em>International Political Science Review<\/em> 22, no. 3 (2001). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/1601484\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/1601484<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref39\" id=\"_ftn39\">[39]<\/a> William R. Morrison. \u201cCanadian Sovereignty and the Inuit of the Central and Eastern Arctic\u201d, <em>Inuit Studies <\/em>10, no. 1\/2 (1986): 246. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/42869548\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/42869548<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref40\" id=\"_ftn40\">[40]<\/a> ibid, 247.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref41\" id=\"_ftn41\">[41]<\/a> ibid, 248.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref42\" id=\"_ftn42\">[42]<\/a> Inuit Tapiritt Kanatami (ITK). <em>An Inuit Vision for Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Defence<\/em>. (Ottawa: ITK, 2025), 5.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The link between Arctic sovereignty and the well-being of Inuit is rooted in dual duties of the Canadian state: (1) broad duties to all Canadians in its territory and (2) specific duties to Inuit through treaty obligations. Accomplishing these dual duties legitimizes the political authority of the Canadian state in the Arctic, especially since Inuit are the region\u2019s majority population.<\/p>\n<div id=\"ifsd-learn-more-button-link-block_fef650ef254dae4bf246a88d7ab96181\" class=\"ifsd-learn-more-button continue-reading-more-link\">\n\t<a class=\"ifsd-learn-more-button__link\" href=\"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/2025\/08\/linking-arctic-sovereignty-and-the-well-being-of-inuit-exploring-the-dual-duties-of-the-canadian-state\/\" target=\"_self\">\n\t\t<span id=\"ifsd-learn-more-button-link-text-block_fef650ef254dae4bf246a88d7ab96181\" class=\"ifsd-learn-more-button-link-text\">\n\t\t\tPour en savoir plus\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<span id=\"ifsd-learn-more-button-link-marker-block_fef650ef254dae4bf246a88d7ab96181\" class=\"ifsd-learn-more-button-link-marker\">\n\t\t\t<svg class=\"ifsd-learn-more-button-link-marker-svg\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" xml:space=\"preserve\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\">\n\t\t\t\t<path class=\"ifsd-learn-more-button-link-marker-svg-bullet\" fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M12 1a11 11 0 0 1 11 11 11 11 0 0 1-11 11A11 11 0 0 1 1 12 11 11 0 0 1 12 1zM9.7 18.7l6.7-6.7-6.7-6.7-1.4 1.4 5.3 5.3-5.3 5.3 1.4 1.4z\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t<path class=\"ifsd-learn-more-button-link-marker-svg-arrow\" stroke=\"none\" stroke-width=\"2\" d=\"m9 18 6-6-6-6\"\/>\n\t\t\t<\/svg>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t<\/a>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4162,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[22],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4161","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-last-page"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4161","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4161"}],"version-history":[{"count":24,"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4161\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4218,"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4161\/revisions\/4218"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4162"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4161"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4161"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ifsd.ca\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4161"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}